Abstract. Let a sentence be second-level indeterminate just in case it has different truth-values under different acceptable assignments of semantic values, and let a sentence be first-level indeterminate just in case there are acceptable assignments under which the sentence lacks a classical, determinate truth-value. Many theorists of vagueness take for granted that the indeterminacy with which vagueness is associated is first-level indeterminacy. The chief opposing view is the epistemicist view, according to which the indeterminacy with which vagueness is associated is merely an epistemic phenomenon. I argue that vagueness is better seen as associated with second-level indeterminacy.
assigning a semantic value to the sentence, but the semantic value in question is neuter. (Consider reference failure and presupposition failure. If these phenomena give rise to there being sentences that are neuter, these cases are of this kind.) Second, there can fail to be a determinately best way of assigning a semantic value to the sentence. There can be several acceptable assignments, and the sentence can have different semantic value under the different acceptable assignments.
Introducing some terminology, let us say that the distinction just drawn is between firstlevel and second-level indeterminacy. A sentence is second-level indeterminate just in case it has different truth-values under different acceptable assignments of semantic values. A sentence is first-level indeterminate just in case there are acceptable assignments under which the sentence lacks a classical, determinate truth-value. Analogously, we can define first-level and second-level indeterminacy for subsentential expressions. A subsentential expression is second-level indeterminate just in case it has different semantic values under different acceptable assignments.
A subsentential expression is first-level indeterminate just in case there are acceptable assignments under which its semantic value is somehow indeterminate. Of course, not all cases of lack of classical determinate truth-values are strictly cases of indeterminacy (I mentioned some just above). But let us stick with these labels, for here the focus will be on varieties of indeterminacy. The point is then that Quine's thesis is that there is second-level indeterminacy, but Quine is by no means committed to there being first-level indeterminacy.
Turn now to vagueness. It is widely assumed that vagueness is associated with some sort of (semantic or ontological) indeterminacy. Among those who make this assumption, it is also widely assumed (an apparent exception will be discussed) that the indeterminacy in question is first-level. That is, it is assumed that if vagueness indeed is associated with some sort of indeterminacy, what this means is that the semantic values best ascribed to vague sentences are such that these sentences lack classical, determinate truth-values: witness the different nonclassical semantics that have been proposed as the right semantics of vagueness. It is not assumed that there will not be a best way of ascribing a semantic value to vague sentences.
Epistemicists often argue as against those who take the proper semantics of vagueness to be non-classical/non-bivalent that such a strategy cannot possibly provide part of the solution to the philosophical problem of vagueness.
2 Consider first someone who presents a three-valued logic and a three-valued semantics. The problem here that epistemicists point to is that it is as implausible that there should be a sharp boundary between the true and the neuter sentences as that there should be a sharp boundary between the true and the false sentences. A similar point holds against the defender of a fuzzy logic of vagueness: there will still be a sharp boundary between the last sentence with truth-value 1 and the first sentence with truth-value <1.
3 On the strength of negative arguments like this, epistemicists go on to identify the apparent indeterminacy with some kind of principled unknowability of truth value. The problem with the epistemicist's own preferred view is that it seems extremely improbable that whatever determines the meanings of vague sentence should determine exactly where the cutoff 'looks red', 'is a mountain', or 'looks roughly like a robin', is. 4 (Call this the determination problem.)
II. VAGUENESS AS SECOND-LEVEL
I'm walking through some standard moves in the philosophy of vagueness very quickly here.
Needless to say, the proponents of the various positions discussed have responses -and responses worth taking seriously -to all the problems here. 5 But rather than discussing the actual and possible responses and counterresponses, let me present a positive proposal that appears to avoid the whole cluster of problems we are getting into. It is that we should take vagueness primarily to be associated with second-level indeterminacy, rather than first-level indeterminacy. For brevity, call it the thesis that vagueness is second-level.
On the view that vagueness is second-level, one can endorse the epistemicist criticism of common proposals to the effect that the proper semantics for vagueness is non-classical/nonbivalent, and hold that every acceptable assignment of semantic values to vague expressions is such as to support classical logic and bivalence. (There are of course other possible reasons to abandon classical logic and bivalence but let us not here get into them.) The determination problem is avoided. For if vagueness is second-level, the fact that whatever factors determine the meanings of our expressions have not determined exact boundaries for vague predicates is reflected in there being different acceptable assignments of semantic values to these expressions.
Not that it is in any way strange or prima facie unreasonable to assume vagueness rather to be associated with first-level indeterminacy. I take it that the intuitive picture associated with the semantics of vague predicates is that their extensions sort of fade off, in a way that may reasonably be thought best captured by, e.g., fuzzy logic. But intuitive though this view may be, the philosophical discussion of vagueness has arguably taught us that no specific assignment of semantic values to vague predicates, not even a fuzzy one, can fully satisfy our conception of what the extensions of vague predicates are like.
3 For discussion, see Williamson, op.cit., and also Sainsbury and Williamson (1997) and Keefe and Smith (1997) . 4 Being a standard objection to epistemicism, this objection is presented in many places; but two nice presentations are found in Schiffer (2003) (2001), pp. 69-70. The latter article also discusses some problems concerning how exactly best to conceive of the point. Wright there argues that above statement of the point must be severely qualified. Instead of saying straight out that both verdicts are permissible, we should characterize borderline cases as Quandaries, as cases where "we do not know, do not know how we might come to know, and can produce no reason for thinking that there is any way of coming to know what to say or think, or who has the better of a difference of opinion" (p. 71). The basic point stands: "thirdpossibility" views on indeterminacy, according to which indeterminacy contrasts with truth and falsity, are unacceptable. 7 The classic defense of supervaluationism about vagueness is still Field (1974) .)
The thesis that vagueness is second-level is neutral between different accounts of what, specifically, vagueness is. But just to further illustrate the issues here, let me present one view on vagueness -my own, as it happens -given which vagueness is second-level. 10 Elsewhere, I have myself defended an account of vagueness given which vague expressions on account of their vagueness give rise to second-level indeterminacy. Very briefly, my view is an inconsistency view on vagueness. The vagueness of an expression consists in it being necessary for full competence with the expression to be disposed to take it to be tolerant -despite the fact that tolerance is an incoherent feature of expressions, and no expression can actually be tolerant. 11 On an 9 Not that I am the first to associate vagueness with second-level indeterminacy. It seems that what Richmond Campbell (1974) means by "semantic uncertainty" (p. 180) is something like second-level indeterminacy. Also, Agustín Rayo (manuscript) distinguishes between (i) the claim that it is a matter of degree whether a sentence is used to mean a given proposition and (ii) the claim that it is a matter of degree whether a proposition is true. This distinction clearly is analogous to the present distinction between the first and the second level. 10 See further my (2002) Whereas large enough differences in F's parameter of application sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters. (Wright 1975, p. 334) This is the standard formulation of tolerance. Actually it does not quite work, for there are clearly vague predicates that come out non-tolerant on this characterization of tolerance. Consider the predicate "is a small integer" and note that 3 determinately is in its extension, and 3.000001 determinately is not. The modification is to think of a predicate's tolerance as consisting in there being some series of objects that F is meaningfully applicable to such that (i) F is true of the first object in the series and F is false of the last object in the series, and (ii) such that for any two objects a, b adjacent in the series, if F(a), then F(b).
be too little attention paid in the vagueness literature to the difference between kinds of, or sources of, indeterminacy. Typically, the only question that is raised is that of whether vagueness is a matter of semantic or of ontological indeterminacy: and that is that. 
